This paper gives the formal definitions for security metrics proposed by Simoens et al.[11] and Nagar et al.[1], and analyze the relations. [11] defined comprehensive metrics for all biometric template protection algorithms. Their security-related metrics are defined as the measurement of performance in various setting. Whereas [1] also defined similar but different performance-based metrics with a focus on the two-factor authentication scenario. One problem of performance-based metrics is its ambiguous relation with the security goals often discussed in the context of biometric cryptosystems [7] . The objective of this paper is to complement the previous work by Simoens et al.[11] in two points: (1) it gives formal definitions for metrics defined in [11] in order to make it applicable to biometric cryptosystems, and (2) it covers all security metrics for every variation in the two-factor authentication scenario, namely both or either of the key and/or the protected template is given to adversary.
Introduction
Biometric information is unique to each user and unchangeable during his or her lifetime. Once a biometric template is leaked together with one's identity, the person will face a severe risk of identity theft. Template protection algorithms [10, 9, 5, 15, 14] enable the matching of biometric template without revealing the original biometric features. Hence, the risk of leaking the original biometric feature is drastically reduced. According to a taxonomy [13] , Template protection algorithms are categorized into two approaches: feature transformation approach and biometric cryptosystems. In the following, we will see how the security of each scheme is evaluated in previous studies.
Feature transformation
Feature transformation, or cancelable biometrics [15] , takes a key as a transformation parameter. It transforms an original biometric feature into a deformed one, hence this approach intrinsically assume two-factor authentication. One advantage of this approach is that it can utilize the already-known high performance matching algorithms because the metric used for comparison of biometric features is often invariant under the transformation.
Ratha et al. proposed several schemes for fingerprint template protection [14] based on displacement of fingerprint minutiae at different locations using an irreversible locally smooth transformation. They evaluated its recognition performance as follows. Genuine users have their correct keys whereas imposter users with randomly chosen keys. Since a key is introduced in the measurement of its performance, the recognition performance of the template protection techniques is improved. This notion of performance is defined later as accuracy in Section 3.1. They discussed a notion of irreversibility as well, but it is not clearly defined.
Teoh et al. [8, 4, 19, 17, 18] proposed BioHashing, an injective transformation parameterized by a user-specific key. In [18] , in addition to accuracy as discussed in Ratha et al. [14] , they presented good performances in the following notions: recognition performance when the key is stolen, diversity and irreversibility. The first two notions are naturally come from the two-factor authentication scenario, related to the performance of rejecting imposter attempt when the correct keys are presented and rejecting genuine attempt when various incorrect keys are presented, respectively. We discuss these notions further as biometric performance and diversity in Section 3, respectively. Their notion of irreversibility requires the adversary to recover exactly the same biometric feature as the original. This weak notion 1 of irreversibility is discussed in Section 4.1.
Biometric cryptosystem
Biometric cryptosystem refers to a series of research motivated by fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault proposed by Juels and Watenburg [10] and Juels and Sudan [9] , respectively. They abstracted the metric space of a biometrics matching as a hamming distance or a set difference respectively, and make use of error-correcting codes to check if the distance of two biometric features is within a correctable range. Dodis, Reyzin and Smith [5] generalized them to secure sketch covering any transitive metric space. Their notion of irreversibility is defined as the difficulty, given a protected template, to find a biometric feature such that it reveals the original biometric feature from the protected template using error-correcting code. Namely, the adversary is required to recover a biometric feature only "close" to the original, much easier than recovering the original itself. These notions of irreversibility are discussed in Section 4.1.
Biometric cryptosystems [10, 9, 5] are often un-keyed, hence suffer from FMR-attack [11] . Namely, imposter attempts succeed at least with probability FMR. Sutcu, Li and Memon [16] applied secure sketch, hence un-keyed, to a face recognition system, and measured a biometric performance and estimated a lower-bound of irreversibility. They reported that the degradation of recognition performance introduced by secure sketch was negligible, but the lower-bound of complexity to break irreversibility was barely 20 bits. Arakala, Jeffers and Horadam [2] and Chang and Roy [3] applied variants of secure sketch to fingerprint recognition systems, and reported similar results. Naively thinking, more accurate schemes seem to achieve stronger irreversibility. Surprisingly, however, as stated in Theorem 2, our analysis shows that accurate schemes are unlikely able to achieve sufficient irreversibility. Therefore, without loss of generality, we focus on two-factor authentication scenario in the following discussion.
Related security metrics
Nagar et al. [13] proposed security metrics applicable to various template protection algorithms. Their security metrics consists of six items: FAR U K , FAR KK , IRIS , IRID, CMR T and CMR O . Their metrics correspond to a subset of our metrics, as shown in Table 1 . Simoens et al. [11] proposed comprehensive metrics, ranging from technical performance such as recognition accuracy, throughput and storage requirement, protection performance through operational performance. We picked up some of their metrics which are related to security evaluation, and made extensions to cover all situations in the two-factor authentication scenario. Thus, there is a trivial correspondence between metrics in Simoens et al. [11] and ours.
Nagar et al. [13] and Simoens et al. [11] , both define a protection performance through an experimental analysis. For example, Simoens et al. [11] defines unlinkability as the false cross match rate (F CM R) and the false non-cross match rate (F N CM R). These rates are measured as a performance of some algorithm, called cross-comparator. In an experimental analysis, the cross-comparator should be given concretely. Hence, the rates strongly depends on a se-Nagar et al. [13] This paper 
Preliminaries
In this section, we will explicitly formulate biometric template protection (BTP) algorithms. In this paper, we discuss BTP algorithms utilizing a common modality and a common feature extraction algorithm. Namely we do not discuss BTP algorithms using multi-biometrics.
Let U be a finite set consisting of all users who have biometric characteristics utilized in BTP algorithms. Assume that each user u ∈ U has his/her own biometric characteristic b u and therefore, in the following, we identify u with b u and use the notation u instead of b u , namely, the set U can be regarded as a set consisting of all individuals' biometric characteristics. A biometric recognition system captures biometric samples from biometric characteristics presented to the sensor of the system, extracts biometric features from biometric samples, and verifies or identifies users by using their biometric features. We assume that each user's biometric features are represented as a digital element x ∈ M of a finite set M. We call x a feature element of u. Since two feature elements generated from u are rarely identical, we let X u denote a random variable on M representing noisy variations of feature elements of u, namely P (X u = x) is the probability that a biometric sample captured from u will be represented as x. Let R be the set of all real numbers and let d : M × M → R be a semimetric function on M, namely the real-valued function d satisfies the following three conditions:
For any set T , the notation t $ ← T denotes that t is chosen from the set T uniformly at random. For any random variable X on a set M, the notation x ← X denotes that x is chosen according to X.
For any function f on the set M, the notation E x←X f (x) denotes the expected value of f under the condition that x is chosen according to the random variable X,
. Moreover, we often
A be a deterministic or randomized algorithm on M whose input x ∈ M is chosen according to a random variable X and outputs an element of M ′ . Then A(X) denotes a random variable induced on the image of A and, for any func-
Traditional biometric comparison algorithms are assumed to utilize an ordinary comparison method which, for an enrolled feature element and a freshly extracted feature element x ′ during verification, decides match if d(x, x ′ ) ≤ τ , and otherwise non-match by using a decision threshold τ . Then, the false non-match rate FNMR d≤τ and the false match rate FMR d≤τ are formulated as follows:
Biometric template protection algorithms We will give an explicit formulation of biometric template protection (BTP) algorithms as follows.
Definition 1 (BTP algorithms). A biometric template protection (BTP) algorithm Π is a tuple of polynomialtime algorithms Gen, PIE, PIR, PIC, namely Π = (Gen, PIE, PIR, PIC). Let Gen be an algorithm which on input 1 k returns the public parameters p, which are employed in the algorithms, PIE, PIR and PIC, where k is a security parameter. Let PIE be a randomized algorithm which on input x ∈ M returns a pair (π, α) of two data π ∈ M PI and α ∈ M AD , where M PI and M AD are finite sets. The algorithm PIE is called a pseudonymous identifier encoder. The first output π (resp. the second output α) of PIE is called a pseudonymous identifier (PI) for enrollment (resp. an auxiliary data (AD)) and is denoted by
. The algorithm PIE can be regarded as a pair of two randomized algorithms PIE 1 and PIE 2 . In the enrollment phase, a biometric characteristic u ∈ U is submitted to the system, a feature element x ∈ M is generated according to the distribution X u , the algorithm PIE outputs (π, α) on input x, and π and α are stored in some storages. Note that π and α are not necessarily stored together in the same storage.
Let PIR be a deterministic algorithm which, on input
is called a pseudonymous identifier for verification. Let PIC be a deterministic algorithm which, on input π ∈ M PI and π ′ ∈ M ′ PI , returns either match or non-match. The algorithms PIR and PIC are called a pseudonymous identifier recorder and a pseudonymous identifier comparator, respectively.
In the verification phase, a biometric characteristic u ∈ U is freshly presented to the system, a new feature element x ′ ∈ M is generated according to X u . The verification entity receives a PI π, an AD α and x ′ , computes π ′ = PIR(α, x ′ ), and outputs PIC(π, π ′ ) ∈ {match, non-match}.
Note that the terms, pseudonymous identifier (PI) and auxiliary data (AD), are defined in ISO/IEC 24745 [6] , where a PI is defined to be a set of data that represents an individual or data subject within a certain domain by means of a protected identity and is used as a reference for verification by means of a captured biometric sample and an AD, and an AD is defined to be a set of data that can be required to reconstruct a PI during verification. It is desirable that the PI does not allow the retrieval of the enrolled biometric feature element and multiple "unlinkable" PIs can be derived from the same biometric characteristic. In some schemes, an AD depends on the enrolled biometric feature element.
A pair (π, α) of PI and AD is called a protected template (PT) in [11] or a renewable biometric reference in [6] . In [11] , in general, PTs are assumed to be public. However, most existing BTP algorithms require secrecy of PT, because, in the real world, for some modalities (e.g. fingerprint, iris, face and so on) there are many public large databases, and therefore, the adversary can find a matching sample by entirely running such a database against a stolen PT. Therefore, in this paper, both PIs and ADs are assumed to be secret information. Each user's PI and AD are separately stored in different storages, for example, in application to 2-factor authentication systems, each user's PI is stored together with the user's ID in the database and each user's AD is stored in the user's smart card. We will discuss the recognition performance and the security performance mainly when one of PI and AD is leaked. Simoens et al. [11] regard such a data separation as an additional property of BTP.
Definition 2 (2-factor BTP). We will define a 2-factor BTP authentication algorithms in which a biometric characteristic is the first authentication factor. There are two possibilities from the viewpoint of data separation. A scheme which utilizes ADs as second factors and stores PIs for verification in the database is called a AD-2-factor BTP. Reversely, a scheme which utilizes PIs for verification as second factors and stores ADs in the database is called a PI-2-factor BTP.
Recognition performance for BTP algorithms 3.1. Accuracy
For any BTP algorithm Π = (PIE, PIR, PIC), the false non-match rate of Π, FNMR Π , is the probability that a mated pair of PT and biometric sample are falsely declared to be non-match, namely,
Here, we will define recognition accuracy metrics for 2factor BTPs, which are called total performance and naturally introduced from the notion, data separation, discussed by Simoens et al. [11, Section 4.4] . The false match rate for total performance of AD-2-factor BTP (resp. PI-2factor BTP) Π, FMR TP Π, AD (resp. FMR TP Π, PI ), is the probability that a zero-effort impostor's presentation of his own biometric characteristic u ∈ U along with a 2nd factor α ∈ M AD (resp. π ∈ M PI ) generated from u is falsely declared to match a non-mated reference data π ∈ M PI (resp. α ∈ M AD ) generated from a biometric characteristic v ∈ U \{u}. The metrics FMR TP Π, AD and FMR TP Π, PI are respectively formulated by
Nagar et al. [1] propose the above metric, FMR TP Π, AD , as the false accept rate with unknown transformation parameters, FAR U K .
By measuring the above metrics, FNMR Π , FMR TP Π, AD , and FMR TP Π, PI , we can totally evaluate the recognition performance of 2-factor BTPs. However, a 2-factor BTP can achieve a high recognition performance when the recognition accuracy contributed by one factor is high, even if the recognition accuracy contributed by the other factor is poor. Therefore, we need to evaluate the recognition accuracy achieved only by using one factor. In the following sections, Section 3.2 and 3.3, we will define metrics for such recognition accuracy.
Biometric performance
In this section, we will define a metric for the recognition accuracy achieved only by the 1st factor, biometrics. The false match rate for biometric performance of Π, FMR BP Π , is the probability that a zero-effort impostor's presentation of his own biometric characteristic u ∈ U along with a correct 2nd factor is falsely declared to match a genuine reference data. Then the metric FMR BP Π is formulated by
Simoens et al. [11] discussed this metric as an ordinary recognition accuracy metric, the false match rate, because they mainly consider biometric-based single factor authentication systems which stores PIs and ADs in the database. Moreover, Nagar et al. [1] propose this metric as the false accept rate with known transformation parameters, FAR KK .
This metric can be regarded as a metric for security against impersonation when a user's 2nd factor is leaked. In the above notion, biometric performance, the adversary is assumed to be very weak, namely he presents his own biometric characteristic along with obtained genuine user's 2nd factor. However, in order to strictly evaluate security against impersonation, we need to define a stronger attack model. We would discuss such a rigorous security in another paper in preparation.
Diversity
Diversity is the notion which ensures renewability for 2factor BTPs. Namely, after a PT generated from u ∈ U is renewed, a presentation of u along with the old 2nd factor should not be declared to match the new reference data. Diversity is also the property that PTs should not allow crossmatching across databases in different authentication systems. (cf. [7, III] , [1, Sect. 3.3] , [11, Sect. 3.5] ). We will define a metric for diversity as follows. The false match rate for diversity of BTP algorithm Π, FMR Div Π , is the probability that a presentation of a biometric characteristic u ∈ U along with a 2nd factor generated from u is falsely declared to match a new reference data freshly generated from the same u. The metric FMR Div Π is formulated by
Nagar et al. [1] proposes this metric as the cross match rate, CMR. Here we consider the corresponding entropy H = − log FMR Div Π . Then, it indicates that the distribution of PTs generated form a biometric characteristic are almost the same as the uniform distribution on H-bit binary strings, namely 2 H independent PTs can be generated from a biometric characteristic. Simoens et al. [11] propose the number of such "independent" PTs as a metric for diversity.
Diversity can be regarded as a metric for security against impersonation when a user's biometric characteristic is leaked. For example, in the real world, a fingerprint left on a glass is abused by a malicious user. However, in the above diversity notion, the adversary is assumed to be very weak, namely he submits a 2nd factor randomly generated from the obtained biometric characteristic. By using the obtained biometric characteristic, a stronger adversary might be able to find a 2nd factor which makes PIC return match with extremely higher probability. We would discuss such a strict security notion in another paper in preparation.
Protection peformance for BTP algorithms 4.1. Irreversibility
Suppose that the adversary obtains (a part of) a PT leaked from the database or from the user's storage devices. The adversary might be able to recover a feature element close to the original feature element from which the PT is generated. Form the recovered feature element, he might create a physical spoof of the user's biometric characteristic and impersonate the user by presenting the fake biometric characteristic to the system. Irreversibility is a requirement that it should be hard to recover an original feature element (or its neighborhood) from (a part of) a PT, which ensures the security in the case of leakage of PTs.
For each nonempty subset Λ of the terms {P I, AD} and any PT (π, α), let (π, α) Λ denote a subset of {π, α} defined by (π, α) {P I,AD} = (π, α), (π, α) {P I} = π, and (π, α) {AD} = α. We call (π, α) Λ a Λ-subset of (π, α)
We will define an irreversibility game (IRR Game) between the challenger Ch and the adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where A 1 is a probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) adversary which is given the algorithms and the parameters of Π and sends a state to A 2 , and A 2 is a ppt adversary who is given a Λ-subset of a PT generated from a feature element x ∈ M extracted from a randomly chosen biometric characteristic and attempts to guess (a neighborhood of) the original feature element x.
Recently, for most major modalities, there are many databases available to the public. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the adversary easily obtains a huge database of biometric samples. In this case, the adversary can performs an offline attack and successfully find a target feature element. In order to formulate such a practical situation, we will define an oracle from which the adversary can obtain feature elements corresponding to biometric characteristics submitted as queries. More precisely, let Samp be an oracle which, on input u ∈ U , chooses x ∈ M according to X u and returns x. We assume that the challenger and the adversary are allowed to make polynomial-time queries to Samp before they return their guess.
For any nonempty subset Λ ⊂ {PI, AD} and any real number τ ≥ 0, we define Λ-τ -authorized leakage irreversibility game (Λ-AL τ IRR Game) (resp. Λ-pseudo authorized leakage irreversibility game (Λ-PAL IRR Game)) as follows.
Λ-AL τ IRR Game (resp. Λ-PAL IRR Game)
Step 1. The challenger Ch inputs 1 k into Gen and Gen returns the parameters p. The challenger Ch chooses u ∈ U uniformly at random, sends a query u to Samp, receives a feature element x of u from Samp, and sends (p, Λ, τ ) (resp. (p, Λ)) to the adversary A 1 .
Step 2. The adversary A 1 receives (p, Λ, τ ) (resp. (p, Λ)) and sends a state s to A 2 . The adversary A 1 is allowed to make polynomial-time queries to Samp before he sends s to A 2 .
Step 3. The challenger Ch chooses a biometric characteristic u ∈ U uniformly at random, submits u to the sampling oracle Samp, and gets a feature element x ∈ M from Samp. The challenger Ch inputs the feature element x into PIE, gets the output (π, α), and sends (π, α) Λ to the adversary A 2 .
Step 4. The adversary A 2 receives the state s and (π, α) Λ from A 1 and Ch, respectively, and returns x ′ ∈ M. The adversary A 2 is allowed to make polynomial-time queries to Samp before he returns his guess.
If d(x, x ′ ) ≤ τ (resp. PIC(π, PIR(α, x ′ )) = match), then the adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) wins. The Λ-AL τ IRR Game indicates the threat that the adversary obtaining a subset of a PT might successfully recover a feature element close to the original feature element and impersonate the user in traditional authentication systems which does not use BTP algorithms and determines some decision threshold τ . Moreover, the Λ-PAL IRR Game indicates the threat that the adversary might also find a feature element x ′ which is not close to the original feature element x but matches the PT in the BTP algorithm, namely d(x, x ′ ) > τ but PIC(π, PIR(α, x ′ )) = match, since the BTP algorithm might accept feature elements outside the τ -neighborhood of the original feature element, For any feature element x ∈ M, the match rate of the feature element x with respect to d ≤ τ (resp. the reverse match rate of the feature element x) MR d≤τ (x) (resp. rMR Π (x) ) is the probability that a feature element x ′ ∈ M (resp. a PT (π, α)) generated from a randomly chosen biometric characteristic u ∈ U satisfies d(x, x ′ ) ≤ τ (resp. PIC(π, PIR(α, x)) = match), which is formulated by
Put
In Λ-AL τ IRR Game (resp. Λ-PAL IRR Game), the optimal strategy of an adversary A ′ who is not given (π, α) Λ is to return a feature element x satisfying MR d≤τ (x) = m d≤τ (resp. rMR Π (x) = m Π ) and then the success probability of the adversary A ′ is equals to m d≤τ (resp. m Π ). Therefore, the advantage Adv Λ-ALτ IRR We say that a BTP algorithm Π is ε-Λ-τ -authorized-leakage irreversible (ε-Λ-AL τ IRR) if Adv Λ-ALτ IRR Π,A < ε for any ppt adversary A. In particular, we say that Π is ε-Λ-fullleakage irreversible (ε-Λ-FL IRR) if Adv Λ-AL0 IRR Π,A < ε for any ppt adversary A.
) of the adversary A is defined by
Definition 4 (Pseudo-authorized-leakage irreversibility (cf. [11] )). We say that a BTP algorithm Π is ε-Λ-
< ε for any ppt adversary A.
The above definitions immediately imply the following theorem. We omit the proof. 
Moreover, assume that τ satisfies the condition that, for any x ∈ M and any PT (π, α) generated from x, PIC(π, PIR(α,
Simoens et al. [11] also introduce the above metrics, FL IRR, AL IRR, and PAL IRR, as the difficulty of determining (a neighborhood of) the original feature element. Note that, in the attack model in [11] the adversary is given the whole PT. Here, we discuss unachievability of PAL IRR in the case when the adversary is given the whole PT, namely Λ = {PI, AD}. Actually, when the adversary obtains both the PI and the AD, he can find a target feature element with extremely high probability by making a certain amount of queries to Samp. We will more precisely discuss as follows.
For any PT (π, α) ∈ M PI × M AD , the match rate of the PT (π, α), MR Π (π, α), is the probability that a feature element x ′ ∈ M generated from a randomly chosen biometric characteristic u ∈ U satisfies PIC(π, PIR(α, x ′ )) = match, which is formulated by
The MR Π (π, α) can be regarded as a random variable over the distribution of (π, α). Let MR Π denote the average of MR Π (π, α), namely
Let σ is the standard deviation of the MR Π (π, α). Then, from Chebyshev's inequality, we have
for any δ > 0.
Here, we assume that MR Π and σ are constants independent of the security parameter k. Let C be the variation coefficient of MR Π (π, α), namely C = σ MR Π . Assume that C < 1.
Theorem 2. For all ε < 1 − C 2 − m Π , there exists no ε-{PI, AD}-PAL IRR BTP algorithm.
In general, more accurate BTP algorithms Π have smaller C. Therefore, Theorem 2 states that accurate BTP algorithms are unlikely to achieve sufficient irreversibility when both PI and AD are compromised 4 . We can also similarly prove unachievability of AL IRR when the adversary is given the whole PT under the assumptions slightly different from the case of PAL IRR. In this paper, we omit the proof of Theorem 2 and a precise description of the statement for the case of AL IRR and describe them in a full version of this paper.
Unlinkability
For any nonempty subset Λ ⊂ {PI, AD}, we will define Λ-UNLINK Game between the challenger Ch and the adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), where A is given Λ-subsets of two PTs and attempts to guess whether the PTs are generated from the same biometric characteristics or not. In this game, Ch and A are allowed to make polynomial-time queries to the sampling oracle Samp.
Λ-UNLINK Game
Step 1. The challenger Ch inputs 1 k into Gen and Gen returns the parameters p. The challenger Ch chooses u ∈ U uniformly at random, sends a query u to Samp, receives a feature element x of u from Samp, and sends (p, Λ) to the adversary A 1 .
Step 2. The adversary A 1 receives (p, Λ), outputs three feature elements x, x 0 , x 1 depending on a distribution selected by A 1 , sends (x, x 0 , x 1 ) to Ch, and sends a state s to A 2 , where s contains (x, x 0 , x 1 ). The adversary A 1 is allowed to make polynomial-time queries to Samp before he sends s to A 2 .
Step 3. The challenger Ch flips the random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, inputs x, x b into PIE, gets P T = PIE(x) and P T ′ = PIE(x b ), and sends (
Step 4. The adversary A 2 receives the state s and ( (P T ) Λ , (P T ′ ) Λ ) from A 1 and Ch, and returns b ′ ∈ {0, 1} as a guess of b. The adversary A 2 is allowed to make polynomial-time queries to Samp before he returns his guess.
If b ′ = b, then the adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) wins. The advantage Adv Λ-UNLINK Π,A of the adversary A over the random guess is formulated by
Definition 5 (Unlinkability). We say that a BTP algorithm
< ε for any ppt adversary A.
Here, we will show unachievability of unlinkability when both PI and AD are compromised.
Theorem 3. Assume that, for any x ∈ M and any PT (π, α) generated from x, PIC(π, PIR(α, x)) = match. For any ε ≤ 1 − MR Π , there exists no ε-{PI, AD}-UNLINK BTP algorithm.
In general, more accurate BTP algorithms Π have smaller MR Π . Therefore, Theorem 3 states that accurate BTP algorithms are unlikely to achieve sufficient unlinkability when both PI and AD are compromised 5 . We omit the proof of Theorem 3 and describe it in a full version of this paper.
Simoens et al. [11] define a metric for unlinkability by using the false cross match rate (FCMR) and the false non-cross-match rate (FNCMR). They define an adversary A cc = (A cc 1 , A cc 2 ), who is called the cross-comparator. In Λ-UNLINK Game, the adversary A cc 1 chooses a pair (u, v) ∈ (U × U ) diff of two different biometric characteristics, submits u to Samp independently twice, and receives x and x 0 respectively as the answers of two queries, moreover submits v to Samp, and receives x 1 as the answer, sends (x, x 0 , x 1 ) to Ch, and sends a state s containing (x, x 0 , x 1 ) to A cc 2 . The adversary A cc 2 receives the state containing (x, x 0 , x 1 ) and ( (P T 1 ) Λ , (P T 2 ) Λ ) from A cc 1 and Ch, respectively, and returns b ′ ∈ {0, 1} as a guess of b.
The false cross match rate (FCMR) (resp. the false noncross-match rate (FNCMR)) is the probability that, when b = 1 (resp. b = 0), the cross comparator A cc falsely guesses that b ′ = 0 (resp. b ′ = 1), which is formulated as follows: 
Relations among security notions
In this section, we will clarify relations among security notions, irreversibility and unlinkability, defined in the previous sections. We will prove that unlinkability is a stronger notion than authorized-leakage irreversibility. Therefore, unlinkability gives more rigorous assurance on privacy than irreversibility. Before describing the precise statement, we will prepare some notations.
Let P τ (x) be the probability that the τ -neighborhood of x ′ chosen according to the distribution X(U) has nonempty intersection with M τ (x), namely
Put p τ = max x P τ (x) and q τ = min x P τ (x). It is clear that p τ ≤ p τ ′ and q τ ≤ q τ ′ for any τ < τ ′ since P τ (x) ≤ P τ ′ (x).
Theorem 4. For any nonempty subset Λ ⊂ {PI, AD}, if a BTP algorithm Π is ε-Λ-UNLINK, then Π is ε + (p τ − q τ )m d≤τ 1 − p τ -Λ-AL τ IRR for any τ ≥ 0.
We omit the proof of Theorem 4 and describe it in a full version of this paper.
From Theorem 1 and Theorem 4, we have the following figure, Figure 1 , which indicates relations among irreversibility and unlinkability when Λ = PI (resp. Λ = AD). The notation A −→ B means that the notion A is stronger than the notion B. We avoid to show the figure in the case of Λ = {PI, AD}, because, as mentioned after Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, accurate BTP algorithms are unlikely to achieve sufficient irreversibility or unlinkability when both PI and AD are compromised. 
